

overruled—by the Pentagon, Bill Clinton, or an American electorate with no stomach for casualties. The best guarantee of an idealistic policy is consistent idealistic pressure from the electorate.”

Lastly, there is the growing importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). During World War II, Churchill and Roosevelt did not have to contend with Human Rights Watch accusing them of moral deficiency because they were putting military considerations in front of saving concentration camp inmates. If today’s human rights consciousness had existed during World War II—and it is unfortunate that it did not—intelligence reports of Nazi atrocities would have leaked out, and Allied leaders would have been forced to divert resources to attack the death camps.

At the same time, Bass makes clear that, as much as the human-rights movement wishes it were otherwise, the prosecution of war criminals is not an absolute carried out in accordance with universal standards. However, he does not deal with the question of whether existing standards should be compromised or negotiated away in order to produce settlements that can save hundreds of thousands of lives or improve the observance of human rights in a particular country.

As someone who works in the field of conflict resolution, I favor negotiated settlements. In today’s world it is extremely unlikely that the United States and other countries would be willing to wage war to the point of unconditional surrender. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to force from power human rights abusers—like Milosevic, Pinochet, and Saddam Hussein. The only way such people ever agree to step down is through a negotiated agreement that includes amnesty for their crimes. Such an agreement was, in fact, the means by which Pinochet gave up control. He made what was considered a binding agreement, within the Chilean legal framework. That agreement was later, in effect, ignored by a Spanish magistrate and the British courts, citing international human rights standards.

I question whether the application of such standards should be superior to all other considerations. There are times when the only way to get a human rights

abuser out of power or to save lives is to negotiate deals with people who have committed atrocities. If such deals are not considered binding by the international community and can be overruled by a judge in a faraway country, it will become virtually impossible to bring an end to many conflicts. If the Pinochet precedent were extended, could not the carefully negotiated South African agreements that brought an end to apartheid and set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission be negated by a foreign court? Or, what choice would a Milosevic have but to stay in power, if he knows that any arrangement by which he might agree to step down will have no force.

I do not dispute that Milosevic has been guilty of crimes against humanity. I only ask: Would not the greater good be served by negotiating him out of power and, as part of the bargain, guaranteeing him a safe haven?

JOHN MARKS is founder and president of Search for Common Ground in Washington and the European Centre for Common Ground in Brussels.

## Of Moose And Men

By Daniel Akst

RALPH KRAMDEN AND ED NORTON were a couple of working stiffs from Brooklyn. They labored all day to drive a bus up and down Madison Avenue and kept the city’s sewers flowing, but they were also something much more exalted—something mysterious, grand, and, at some level, even sacred. Yes, they were Raccoons, and as members of this great fraternal organization they got to wear those Austro-Hungarian naval uniforms with the fringed epaulets and Davy Crockett caps. Remember the tail-wagging Raccoon handshake? The yodel-like greeting?

That Jackie Gleason and Art Carney played characters in a lodge tells us something about how long fraternal organizations have been the butt of jokes in this country. In *From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890-1967*, David T. Beito, an historian at the University of Alabama, shows that some people were

joking about lodges even before the ’50s, when “The Honeymooners” was made. But their members took these fraternal organizations much more seriously, and by the time Beito is finished we know why: because in an era when there was little if any social safety net, the lodge provided the only insurance many members could afford or obtain.

In his fascinating but strangely affectless new book, Beito tells the remarkable story of fraternal organizations—all those Masons, Moose, Odd-fellows, Woodmen, and so forth—as mutual benefit societies that enabled vast numbers of Americans to safeguard their families without the stigma of charity or the snare of long-term dependence. “A conservative estimate,” Beito writes with stunning matter-of-factness, “would be that one-third of all adult males over age 19 were members in 1910.”

The scope and breadth of these organizations and the benefits they provided is startling. “By 1895 half the value of all life insurance policies in force was on the fraternal plan,” Beito writes, adding that by 1908 “the 200 leading societies had paid well over \$1 billion in death benefits.” But all was not smooth sailing, and Beito shows how the problems these organizations encountered foreshadow the difficulties governments, employers, and health maintenance organizations would struggle with later when trying to accomplish the same social welfare ends.

Organized medicine, for instance, mustered furious opposition to the system of “lodge medicine,” whereby lodges hired physicians on a capitation basis. Almost all the lodges that provided health insurance (or in some cases even ran hospitals) found themselves sorely tested by rapidly rising costs. The death benefits offered by many lodges, meanwhile, were financed on the same pay-as-you-go basis as Social Security, rather than on some reserve system, and until circumstances forced a change, many were actuarially unsound.

On the other hand, the lodges had the advantage of a powerful sense of mutuality reinforced by self-selection and local governance. Lodge benefits were insurance that members themselves had paid for with their dues, rather than the handouts that, in those days, appeared to carry a strong sense of

shame among these hardworking fraternalists. These benefits were self-limiting; fraternal organizations raised funds from their members, most of whom were directly involved at the local level through their lodges. And effective anti-fraud techniques were built in. Beito shows that visits by lodge members to an ailing brother or sister not only brought welcome support but served to confirm whether the aid recipient really was sick or injured.

Contrary to the image of these organizations as havens for sweating Babbity, Beito shows that fraternal organizations were especially popular with people near the bottom of the social scale, who were most in need of the cushion and connections a lodge could provide. Immigrants were hugely active, and just as blacks had their own baseball leagues in the era of segregation, they also had their own fraternal organizations, some of them parallel versions of white groups. (Racism was as common in lodges as the rest of society;

the Improved Order of Redmen, for instance, whose rituals purported to celebrate American Indians, barred any from joining). Women too had groups of their own and auxiliaries to the men's groups.

**FROM MUTUAL AID TO  
THE WELFARE STATE**  
**Fraternal Societies and  
Social Service,  
1890-1967**  
*by David T. Beito*  
University of North  
Carolina Press, \$55.00

Almost without exception, fraternal organizations strove to enforce what in later years would derisively come to be known (mainly by those who grew up in the security of them) as "middle-class values." Virtues like honesty and thrift are desirable for their own sake, of course, but become crucial in a mutual benefit society like a fraternal organization, which depends on member restraint in not abusing the commons.

The decline of American fraternalism has had many causes, as Beito makes clear. Among the biggest, he argues, was the rise of the public welfare state, which usurped the key attraction organizations had for working people. Other reasons include rising affluence, which helped

foster a shift from mutual benefit fraternities to "service" organizations of businessmen—such as Rotary International—who did things for others. On top of everything else, Americans just stopped joining things, as amply demonstrated by Robert D. Putnam's recent book, *Bowling Alone*.

What Beito misses in this otherwise admirable work is the flesh and blood nature of human fellowship, and the way a lodge could lift up people otherwise consigned to lives of drudgery. My own father, for instance, himself a working stiff from Brooklyn, was a proud Knight of Pythias for many years. He always said it was for the burial insurance, but now I see how much more there was to it. He was a bank teller, yet as a Knight he rose to the exalted status of chancellor one year (everybody got a turn to head the lodge), and was called upon to lead, write, and speak publicly. There was organizing, politicking, and charity work, but most of all there was a place where he was somebody.

But Beito has captured one of the most important ways lodges did lift peo-

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ple up, which was to give them a shield against destitution and dependency—a shield of their own making and control. Nowadays, of course, governments and employers provide at least some of the security and sense of identity that people used to get from belonging to a fraternal organization. Probably this is both inevitable and good, but it's also sad that the change has made it easier to just stay home and watch TV.

DANIEL AKST is a freelance writer and author of *St. Burl's Obituary*.

## The Secret Sharer

By Walter Pincus

READING THROUGH *NATIONAL Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War* I was brought back to a seminar I tried to teach at Yale more than two decades ago to students who insisted that I could either teach them how to argue for the end of the CIA or nothing.

The Center for International Policy, which sponsored this volume, was initiated in the midst of those post-Watergate CIA exposures. It was, as Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), one of the co-founders of the Center, explains in his foreword to the book, a time when "our nation's support for dictators and our questionable tactics abroad had earned us a dubious reputation around the world as hostile to human rights." And Harkin sets out what must have been the starting point for each of the essayists: "Intelligence is still required (in the post-Cold War world), but it should be refocused. Its tactics should be circumscribed by the need to build a safer world, based on law and cooperation. Its operations should be less secret and more integrated with the needs of an open and dynamic foreign policy. It is time to forge a new path."

Few would argue with Harkin's words if he were talking about diplomacy and the State Department. But intelligence activities in the real world cannot be based on "law and cooperation." And as far as I can tell, being "less secret" means not being secret at all, particularly if it is tied to "the needs of an open and dynamic foreign policy."

There are a great many historic CIA failures in this book that are worth

bringing together and which my 1976 Yale students could have used to write one half of a manifesto. The first essayist, Roger Hilsman, who last served in government in the 1960s at the State Department during the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, writes: "Covert political action is not only something the United States can do without after the Cold War, it's something the United States could have done without during the Cold War." In a swift *tour d'horizon* of the Cold War intelligence effort, Hilsman summons up failed assassination attempts, the Bay of Pigs, and covert actions in Iran, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. That leads him to call the record of U.S. intelligence "mixed," giving more credit to satellite intercepts and imagery coverage, much as he found U-2 photos more important in the Cuban crisis than human intelligence. For Hilsman, the time has come to shut down "all the CIA stations in American embassies abroad, except for those engaged in liaison with allies." He regards satellite imagery, monitoring foreign broadcasts, and code-breaking as the basic intelligence activities that should remain. Hilsman also recognizes that there are still threats to the United States for which intelligence is required, but he never explains how the few tools he offers can meet these new, smaller, but still venal, enemies.

In a more current and thoughtful vein, Melvin M. Goodman, who left a senior analytical position at the CIA in the Reagan years and has continued to follow intelligence as Chairman of the International Relations Department at the National War College, gets in his requisite licks on a wide variety of agency foul-ups—from politicizing analysis to creating paramilitary groups that now oppose us. Goodman suggests some restructuring along the lines of the British intelligence system, a route worth pursuing. There, the espionage and clandestine collection take place under MI6 and report to the top of the British Foreign Office. Research and analysis, on the other hand, are conducted by an independent organization that is totally separate from both the Foreign Office and the military.

Richard A. Stubbing, who handled

funding of the intelligence community at the Office of Management and Budget for 20 years, reminds us that far more intelligence money goes to Pentagon-run agencies than to the CIA, and he suggests major cuts in that part of the Pentagon's budget. Significantly, he also calls for "greater emphasis on non-military reporting" and for a \$200 million increase in the State Department's diplomatic service budget. "The Foreign Service is not officially part of the intelligence budget," he notes, "but it should be a prime source for satisfying the higher priority assigned to political and economic reporting." It has been a long time since anyone has had the nerve to say that.

Several of the authors focus on congressional oversight, making it stronger or even making it an active partner in developing clandestine programs. That view fails to take into consideration the ever-changing political nature of Congress. If you think the politicization of intelligence analysis by agencies is bad, what kind of intelligence activities can you expect from highly partisan politicians?

When Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the panel carefully and quietly pursued its oversight function. When Rep. Larry Combest (R-Texas) took over, the committee began taking a pro-activist position on the increasingly expensive satellite collection program. Now, Rep. Porter Goss (R-Fla.), the first former CIA case officer to hold the chairmanship in either the House or Senate, has turned oversight into a more sophisticated operation, but with less publicity. Goss' additional positions within the House leadership, as a member of the Rules Committee and a deputy whip, give him an authority in that body that no previous chairman has ever had.

Over on the Senate side, the ups and downs have been more public. While chairman, Sen. Dennis DiConcini (D-Ariz.) got into a feud with R. James Woolsey, President Clinton's first CIA director and the disagreements over budget between the two eventually played a role in Woolsey's early departure. More recently, the current chairman of the Sen-

**NATIONAL INSECURITY: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War**  
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